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Abstract
Cause-effect relations are an important part of human knowledge. In real life, humans often
reason about complex causes linked to complex effects. By comparison, existing formalisms for
representing knowledge about causal relations are quite limited in the kind of specifications
of causes and effects they allow. In this paper, we present the new language C-Log, which
offers a significantly more expressive representation of effects, including such features as the
creation of new objects. We show how C-Log integrates with first-order logic, resulting in
the language FO(C). We also compare FO(C) with several related languages and paradigms,
including inductive definitions, disjunctive logic programming, business rules and extensions of
Datalog.
1 Introduction
Cause-effect relations are an important part of human knowledge. There exist a number
of knowledge representation languages (McCain and Turner 1996; Vennekens et al. 2009;
Cabalar 2012) in which logic programming style rules are used to represent such rela-
tions. The basic idea in all these approaches is that the head of such a rule represents
an effect that is caused by its body. In this paper, we are particularly concerned with
CP-logic (Vennekens et al. 2009). More specifically, we consider the variant of CP-logic
without probabilities, and we will extend this language with three features: dynamic
non-determinsitic choice; object creation; and recursive nesting of cause-effect relations.
We call the resulting language C-Log. In this paper, we present C-Log and its infor-
mal semantics. For the formal semantics, we refer to an accompanying technical report
(Bogaerts et al. 2014a). We also present the integration of C-Log with first-order logic,
and thus show that C-Log fits in the FO(·) Knowledge Base System project (Denecker
2012).
Let us begin by recalling the guiding principles behind CP-logic. When compared to
predecessors, such as the causal logic of McCain and Turner (1996), one of the important
contributions of this languages is to add two modelling principles that are common in
causal modelling. The first is the distinction between endogenous and exogenous prop-
erties, i.e., those whose value is determined by the causal laws in the model and those
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whose value is not, respectively (Pearl 2000). The second is the default-deviant assump-
tion, used also by, e.g., Hall (2004) and Hitchcock (2007). The idea here is to assume
that each endogenous property of the domain has some “natural” state, that it will be in
whenever nothing is acting upon it. For ease of notation, CP-logic identifies the default
state with falsity, and the deviant state with truth. For example, consider the following
simplified model of a bicycle, in which a pair of gear wheels can be put in motion by
pedalling:
Turn(BigGear)← Pedal. (1)
Turn(BigGear)← Turn(SmallGear). (2)
Turn(SmallGear)← Turn(BigGear). (3)
Here, Pedal is exogenous, while Turn(BigGear) and Turn(SmallGear) are endogenous.
The semantics of this causal model is given by a straightforward “execution” of the
rules. The domain starts out in an initial state, in which all endogenous atoms have their
default value false and the exogenous atom Pedal has some fixed value. If Pedal is true,
then the first rule is applicable and may be fired (“Pedal causes Turn(BigGear)”) to
produce a new state of the domain in which Turn(BigGear) now has its deviant value
true. In this way, we construct the following sequence of states (we abbreviate symbols
by their first letter):
{P}
(1)
→ {P,T(B)}
(3)
→ {P,T(B),T(S)}
(2)
→ {P,T(B),T(S)} (4)
Note that firing rule (2) does not change the state of the world, because its effect is
already true. Moreover, it is obvious that this will always be the case, so this rule may
seem redundant. However, many interesting applications of causal models require the use
of interventions (Pearl 2000), e.g., to evaluate counterfactuals or to predict the effects of
actions. As shown by Vennekens et al. (2010), rule (2) allows CP-logic to represent this
example in a way that produces the correct results for all conceivable interventions in a
manner that is more modular and more concise than, among others, Pearl’s structural
models (Pearl 2000).
After rules (1), (3) and (2) have all fired, there are no more rules left whose body is
satisfied and that have not yet fired. At this point, the process is at an end and the domain
has reached a final state. It is this final state, rather than the details of the intermediate
process, that we are really interested in. One of the most important properties of CP-
logic is that, while there may be any number of different processes derived from a causal
theory, the final state that is eventually reached is unique for any given interpretation for
the exogenous predicates—at least, for examples such as this one. In general, CP-logic
also allows rules with a non-deterministic effect, such as:
(Turn(SmallGear) : 0.99)Or (ChainBreaks : 0.01)← Turn(BigGear).
Now, the cause Turn(BigGear) produces one of two possible effects, and there is an as-
sociated probability distribution over these two possibilities. The effect on the semantics
is that, instead of a linear progression of states as in (4), we get a tree structure in which
each firing of a non-deterministic rule introduces a branching of possibilities. When con-
sidering also the probabilities associated to non-deterministic choices, the tree defines a
probability distribution over its leaves, i.e., over the final states that may be reached. It
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was shown in (Vennekens et al. 2009) that, given a specific interpretation for the exoge-
nous atoms, this distribution is unique, even though there may exists many probability
trees that produce it.
In many circumstances, the precise values of the probabilities are not of interest. In such
cases, a non-probabilistic variant of CP-logic may be used, in which these are omitted.
The head of a rule is then simply a disjunction:
Turn(SmallGear)OrChainBreaks← Turn(BigGear).
The trees then no longer produce a probability distribution over final states, but they
describe the set of all final states that may be reached. In other words, this formalism
has a possible world semantics. It is this non-probabilistic variant that concerns us in
this paper.
Like other rule-based approaches to causality, CP-logic uses a very simple way of
specifying the possible effects of some cause, namely, as a disjunction of ground atoms.
Clearly, this does not—or, at least, not directly—cover many interesting phenomena that
may occur in practice:
• A robot enters a room, opens some of the doors in this room, and then leaves by one
of the doors that are open. The robot’s leaving corresponds to a non-deterministic
choice between a dynamic set of alternatives, which is determined by the robot’s
own actions, and therefore cannot be hard-coded into the head of a rule. A language
construct for representing such choices is present in P-log (Baral et al. 2004).
• A stallion and a mare that are put in the same field may cause the birth of a foal.
Therefore, not only the properties of these horses are governed by causal laws, but
also their very existence.
• A horse being the parent of a foal is itself a cause for its own height to have a
causal link to the height of the foal. Therefore, causal laws may be nested, in the
sense that an effect can itself again consist of an entire causal law.
The goal of this paper is to develop an expressive knowledge representation language
that is able to represent these more complex effects, and others like them, in a direct
way. Moreover, we want to do this in a way that extends the approach of CP-logic. To
summarise, the formal semantics of the language should consist of a set of possible worlds,
each of which can be constructed by a non-deterministic causal process. This process will
take place in the context of a fixed interpretation for the exogenous atoms. It will start
from an initial state in which each of the endogenous atoms is at its default value false.
The causal laws of our language will then “fire” and flip atoms to their deviant value,
until no more such flips are possible. Whereas in CP-logic these flips happen one atom
at a time, our extended language will flip sets of atoms at the same time. Moreover, our
logic will present syntax and semantics for object-creation, as is needed in the second of
the above examples.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: we start by introducing causal effect ex-
pressions (CEEs) and their informal semantics in Section 2. In Section 3, we explain how
C-Log is integrated with first-order logic, resulting in FO(C), a member of the FO(·)
family of extensions of first-order logic. We conclude in Section 4 by comparing C-Log
with various other paradigms, including inductive definitions (Denecker and Ternovska
2008), disjunctive logic programming with existential quantifications (You et al. 2013),
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Business Rules systems (Business Rules Group 2000) and Datalog extensions (Green
et al. 2012).
2 Syntax and Informal Semantics
We assume familiarity with basic concepts of first-order logic (FO). Vocabularies, for-
mulas, and terms are defined as usual. A Σ-structure I interprets all symbols (including
variable symbols) in a vocabulary Σ; DI denotes the domain of I and σI , with σ a
symbol in Σ, denotes the interpretation of σ in I. We use I[σ : v] for the structure J
that equals I, except on σ: σJ = v. Domain atoms are atoms of the form P (d) where
the di are domain elements. We use restricted quantifications (Preyer and Peter 2002),
e.g., in FO, these are formulas of the form ∀x[ψ] : ϕ or ∃x[ψ] : ϕ, meaning that ϕ holds
for all (resp. for a) x such that ψ holds. The above expressions are syntactic sugar for
∀x : ψ ⇒ ϕ and ∃x : ψ ∧ ϕ, but such a reduction is not possible for other restricted
quantifiers that we will define below. We call ψ the qualification and ϕ the assertion
of the restricted quantifications. From now on, let Σ be a relational vocabulary, i.e., Σ
consists only of predicate, constant and variable symbols.
2.1 Syntax
Definition 2.1
Causal effect expressions (CEE) are defined inductively as follows:
• if P (t) is an atom, then P (t) is a CEE,
• if ϕ is a first-order formula and C′ is a CEE, then C′ ← ϕ is a CEE,
• if C1 and C2 are CEEs, then C1 AndC2 is a CEE,
• if C1 and C2 are CEEs, then C1 OrC2 is a CEE,
• if x is a variable, ϕ is an FO formula and C′ is a CEE, then Allx[ϕ] : C′ is a CEE,
• if x is a variable, ϕ an FO formula and C′ a CEE, then Selectx[ϕ] : C′ is a CEE,
• if x is a variable and C′ is a CEE, then Newx : C′ is a CEE.
We call a CEE an atom-expression (respectively rule-, And-, Or-, All-, Select- or
New-expression) if it is of the corresponding form. We call a predicate symbol P en-
dogenous in C if P occurs as the symbol of a (possibly nested) atom-expression in C,
i.e., if P occurs in C but not only in first-order formulas, i.e., not only in qualifications
of restricted C-Log quantifications (All and Select) or conditions of rule-expressions.
All other symbols are called exogenous in C. This is a straightforward generalisation of
the same notions in CP-logic. An occurrence of a variable x is bound in a CEE if it
occurs in the scope of a quantification over that variable (∀x, ∃x, Allx, Selectx, or
Newx) and free otherwise. A variable is free in a CEE if it has free occurrences. A
causal theory, or C-Log theory is a CEE without free variables. By abuse of notation,
we often represent a causal theory as a set of CEEs; the intended causal theory is the
And-conjunction of these CEEs. We often use ∆ for a causal theory and C, C′, C1 and
C2 for its subexpressions.
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2.2 Informal Semantics of CEEs
We now present the informal semantics of CEEs, due to space restrictions, the formali-
sation of this semantics is lacking in this paper. For a complete description of the formal
semantics, we refer to an accompanying technical report (Bogaerts et al. 2014a). A CEE
is a description of a set of causal laws. In the context of a state of affairs—which we rep-
resent, as usual, by a structure—a CEE non-deterministically describes a set of effects,
i.e., a set of events that take place and change the state of affairs. We call such a set the
effect setof the CEE. From a CEE C, we can derive causal processes similar to (4); a
causal process is a sequence of intermediate states, starting from the default state, such
that, at each state, the effects described by C take place. The process ends if the effects
no longer cause changes to the state. A structure is a model of a CEE if it is the final
result of such a process. We now explain in a compositional way what the effect set of a
CEE is in a given state of affairs.
The effect of an atom-expressionA is that A is flipped to its deviant state. A conditional
effect, i.e., a rule expression, causes the effect set of its head if its body is satisfied in
the current state, and nothing otherwise. The effect set described by an And-expression
is the union of the effect sets of its two subexpressions; an All-expression Allx[ϕ] : C′
causes the union of all effect sets of C′(x) for those x’s that satisfy ϕ. An expression
C1 OrC2 non-deterministically causes either the effect set of C1 or the effect set of C2; a
Select-expression Selectx[ϕ] : C′ causes the effect set of C′ for a non-deterministically
chosen x that satisfies ϕ. An object-creating CEE New x : C′ causes the creation of a
new domain element n and the effect set of C′(n).
Example 2.2
Permanent residence in the United States can be obtained in several ways. One way is
passing the naturalisation test. Another way is by playing the “Green Card Lottery”,
where each year a number of lucky winners are randomly selected and granted permanent
residence. We model this as follows:
All p[Applied(p) ∧ PassedTest(p)] : PermRes(p)
(Select p[Applied(p)] : PermRes(p))← Lottery.
The first CEE describes the “normal” way to obtain permanent residence; the second
rule expresses that one winner is selected among everyone who applies. If I is a structure
in which Lottery holds, due to the non-determinism, there are many possible effect sets of
the above CEE, namely all sets {PermRes(p) | p ∈ DI ∧ p ∈ AppliedI ∧PassedTest(p)I}
∪ {PermRes(d)} for some d ∈ AppliedI . The two CEEs are considered independent: the
winner could be one of the people that obtained it through standard application, as well
as someone else. Note that in the above, there is a great asymmetry between Applied(p),
which occurs as a qualification of Select-expression, and PermRes(p), which occurs as a
caused atom, in the sense that the effect will never cause atoms of the form Applied(p),
but only atoms of the form PermRes(p). This is one of the cases where the qualification
of an expression cannot simply be eliminated.
Example 2.3
Hitting the “send” button in your mail application causes the creation of a new package
containing a specific mail. That package is put on a channel and will be received some
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(unknown) time later. As long as the package is not received, it stays on the channel. In
C-Log, we model this as follows:
Allm, t[Mail(m) ∧ HitSend(m, t)] : New p : Pack(p)AndCont(p,m)AndOnCh(p, t+ 1)
AndSelectd[d > 0] : Received(p, t+ d)
All p, t[Pack(p) ∧OnCh(p, t) ∧ ¬Received(p, t)] : OnCh(p, t+ 1)
Suppose an interpretation HitSendI = {(MyMail, 0)} is given. A causal process then
unfolds as follows: it starts in the initial state, where all endogenous predicates are false.
The effect set of the above causal effect in that state consists of 1) the creation of
one new domain element, say p, and 2) the caused atoms Pack( p), Cont( p,MyMail),
OnCh( p, 1) and Received( p, 7), where instead of 7, we could have chosen any number
greater than zero. Next, it continues, and in every step t, before receiving the package,
an extra atom OnCh(p, t+ 1) is caused. Finally, in the seventh step, no more atoms are
caused; the causal process ends. The final state is a model of the causal theory.
3 FO(C): Integrating FO and C-Log
First-order logic and C-Log have a straightforward integration, FO(C). Theories in this
logic are sets of FO sentences and CEEs. A model of such a theory is a structure that
satisfies each of its expressions (each of its CEEs and formulas). An illustration is the mail
protocol from Example 2.3, which we can extend with the “observation” that at at some
time point, two packages are on the channel: ∃t, p1, p2 : OnCh(p1, t)∧OnCh(p2, t)∧ p1 6=
p2. Models of this theory represent states of affairs where at least once two packages are
on the channel simultaneously. This entirely differs from And-conjoining our CEE with
Select t, p1, p2[p1 6= p2] : OnCh(p1, t)AndOnCh(p2, t).
The resulting CEE would have unintended models in which two packages suddenly appear
on the channel for no reason.
In FO(C), New-expressions can be simulated with Select-expressions together with
FO axioms expressing the unicity of the newly “created” objects. E.g.,
Newx : P (x, a)AndNewx : Q(x)
is simulated by introducing auxiliary unary predicatesN1 andN2 that identify the objects
created by the expressions and writing:
{(Selectx[t] : (N1(x)AndP (x, a)))AndSelectx[t] : (N2(x)AndQ(x))}
∀x : ¬(N1(x) ∧N2(x))
It is clear thatNew-expressions are more natural and more modular than this simulation.
Despite the syntactical correspondence between CEEs and FO formulas (And corre-
sponds to ∧, All to ∀, . . . ), it is obvious that they have an entirely different meaning,
and that both are useful. This is why we chose to introduce new connectives rather than
overloading the ones of FO. The logic FO(C) has further interesting extensions, e.g., by
adding aggregates in FO formulas, including in qualifications and condit
FO(C): A Knowledge Representation Language of Causality 7
4 Comparison and Future Work
In this section, we compare FO(C) to other existing paradigms. This comparison is only
an initial study. By the time of publishing, a more extended version of a comparison
between FO(C) and other paradigms has appeared (Bogaerts et al. 2014b).
Due to its simple recursive syntax, FO(C) is a very general logic that generalises several
existing logics and shows overlaps with many others in different areas of computational
logic. C-Log is an extension of (the non-probabilistic version of) CP-logic. FO(C) is an
extension of the logic FO(ID) (Denecker and Ternovska 2008). An FO(ID) theory is a
set of FO sentences and inductive definitions (ID), which are sets of rules of the form
∀x : P (t)← ϕ,
where ϕ is an FO formula. Such a rule corresponds to a CEE
Allx[ϕ] : P (t)
or equivalently,
All x[t] : (P (t)← ϕ)
and a definition corresponds to the And-conjunction of its rules. The semantics of
FO(ID) corresponds exactly to the semantics of the corresponding FO(C) theory (Bo-
gaerts et al. 2014a). Denecker et al. (1998) already pointed to the correspondence between
causality and inductive definitions and exploited it for solving the causal ramification
problem of temporal reasoning (McCarthy and Hayes 1969). The CEEs presented here
can be seen as a non-deterministic extension of inductive definitions with an informal
semantics based on causal processes.
FO(C) shows similarity to extensions of disjunctive logic programming (DLP) such
as DLP with existential quantification in rule heads (You et al. 2013) and the stable
semantics for FO as defined by Ferraris et al. (2011). Here constraints correspond to FO
sentences in FO(C) and other rules correspond to C-Log expressions. However, there
is an important semantical difference. Suppose we want to express Example 2.2, where
all people passing a test and one random person are given permanent residence in the
United States. The E-disjunctive program
∃X : permres(X) :- lottery
∀X : permres(X) :- passtest(X)
is similar to
(Selectx[t] : permres(x))← lottery
AndAllx[passtest(x)] : permres(x)
Semantically, the E-disjunctive program imposes a minimality condition: the lottery is
always won by a person succeeding the test, if there exists one. On the other hand, in
FO(C) the two rules execute independently, and models might not be minimal. In this
example, it is the latter that is intended. We believe that one advantage of C-Log is
its clear causal informal semantics. On the other hand, there are ways to simulate the
causal semantics and the New operator of C-Log in E-disjunctive programs while it
follows from complexity arguments that not all E-disjunctive programs can be expressed
in FO(C) (Bogaerts et al. 2014c).
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Other semantics than the stable semantics for DLP have been developed. For example,
Brass and Dix (1996) defined D-WFS, a well-founded semantics for DLP. This semantics
has the property that if a program contains two identical lines, one of them can be
removed. However, in our context, a duplicate effect means that a same causal effect
happens twice (maybe for different reasons), independently, and hence different choices
might be made in each of these rules.
The logic of cause and change (McCain and Turner 1996) differs from C-Log in several
important aspects; in McCain & Turner’s logic both true and false atoms need a cause.
In C-Log on the other hand, endogenous predicates can be false (the default value)
without reason but can only be true (the deviant value) if caused. Moreover, we rule out
unfounded “cyclic” causation. For instance, if Pedal is false, in C-Log, Turn(BigGear)
and Turn(SmallGear) are false but in McCain and Turner’s logic they may be true and
caused by each other. We call this “spontaneous generation” and do not admit it in
C-Log.
We find operators similar to those of C-Log in several other formalisms. For example,
Select-, All-, Or- and rule-expressions are present in the subformalism of the language
Event-B that serves to specify effects of actions (Abrial 2010). TheNew operator is found
in various other rule based paradigms, for example in Business Rules systems (Business
Rules Group 2000). The JBoss manual (Browne 2009) contains the following rule:
when Order ( customer == nu l l ) then i n s e r t L o g i c a l (new
Va l ida t i onRe su l t ( v a l i d a t i o n . customer . m i s s i n g ) ) ;
meaning that if an order is created without customer, a new ValidationResult is created
with the message that the customer is missing. This can be translated to C-Log as
follows:
All y[Order(y) ∧ NoCustumer(y)] : New x : ValidationR(x)AndMessage(x, “. . . ”).
Another field in which related language constructions have been developed is the field
of deductive databases. Abiteboul and Vianu (1991) considered various extensions of Dat-
alog, resulting in non-deterministic semantics for queries and updates. One of the studied
extensions is object creation. Such an extension is present in the LogicBlox system (Green
et al. 2012). An example from the latter paper is the rule: President(p), presidentOf [c] =
p← Country(c) which means that for every country c, a new (anonymous) “derived en-
tity” of type President is created. Of course, this president is not a new person, but it
is new with respect to a given database. Such rules with implicit existentially quantified
head variables correspond with New-expressions in C-Log.
Other Datalog extensions with other forms of object creation exist. For example
Van den Bussche and Paredaens (1995) discuss a version with creation of sets and com-
pare its expressivity with simple object creation.
Non-deterministic choices have been studied intensively in the context of deductive
databases. Krishnamurthy and Naqvi (1988) introduced a non-deterministic choice in
Datalog. This choice was static: choice models are constructed in three steps. First,
models are calculated while ignoring choices (choosing everything); second, this model is
used to select a number of choices for all occurrences of choice goals and third, models are
recalculated with respect to these choice goals. In other work (Sacca` and Zaniolo 1990;
Giannotti et al. 1991), it is argued that static choices do not behave well in the presence
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of recursion; hence dynamic choices were introduced. Sacca` and Zaniolo (1990) use stable
models to provide a model-theoretic description of these dynamic choices. Weidong and
Jinghong (1996) introduced an alternative choice principle on predicates P . There, the
values in certain argument positions in the tuples of P are chosen non-deterministically
in function of the values at the other argument positions. The semantics of that logic
is based on the well-founded semantics; this choice principle is very different from the
principle in C-Log. Compared to these, C-Log resembles most the language of Sacca`
and Zaniolo (1990); the difference is that C-Log supports a recursive syntax and is based
on the well-founded semantics, whereas Sacca` and Zaniolo (1990) use stable semantics.
The above similarities suggest that FO(C) is a promising language to study and unify
many existing logical paradigms and to provide a clear informal semantics for them. An
in-depth semantical analysis of the exact relationship between FO(C) and the languages
described above is an interesting topic for future work. Another research challenge is
extending FO(C) with types, function symbols, arithmetic, etc. in order to make it
useful as a KR-language. We need to study the complexity of various inference tasks in
FO(C), and develop and implement algorithms for these various tasks. By the time of
publication, a first study of complexity and inference in FO(C) has appeared (Bogaerts
et al. 2014c). Another research question is to add probabilities to C-Log to obtain an
extension of the probabilistic CP-logic, and possibly also of other related logics such as
BLOG (Milch et al. 2005) and P-Log (Baral et al. 2004).
References
Abiteboul, S. and Vianu, V. 1991. Datalog extensions for database queries and updates. J.
Comput. Syst. Sci. 43, 1, 62–124.
Abrial, J.-R. 2010. Modeling in Event-B - System and Software Engineering. Cambridge
University Press.
Baral, C., Gelfond, M., and Rushton, N. 2004. Probabilistic reasoning with answer sets.
In Proc. Logic Programming and Non Monotonic Reasoning, LPNMR’04. Springer-Verlag,
21–33.
Bogaerts, B., Vennekens, J., Denecker, M., and Van den Bussche, J. 2014a. C-Log: A
knowledge representation language of causality. Tech. Rep. CW 656, Departement of Com-
puter Science, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
Bogaerts, B., Vennekens, J., Denecker, M., and Van den Bussche, J. (in press) 2014b.
FO(C) and related modelling paradigms. In Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Work-
shop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning, NMR 2014, Vienna, Austria, September 17-19.
Bogaerts, B., Vennekens, J., Denecker, M., and Van den Bussche, J. (in press) 2014c.
Inference in the FO(C) modelling language. In ECAI 2014 - 21th European Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, Prague, Czech Republic, August 18-22, 2014, Proceedings.
Brass, S. and Dix, J. 1996. Characterizing D-WFS: Confluence and iterated GCWA. In Logics
in Artificial Intelligence, J. J. Alferes, L. M. Pereira, and E. Orlowska, Eds. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 1126. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 268–283.
Browne, P. 2009. JBoss Drools Business Rules. From technologies to solutions. Packt Pub-
lishing, Limited.
Business Rules Group. 2000. Defining Business Rules ∼ What Are They Really? Tech. rep.
Cabalar, P. 2012. Causal logic programming. In Correct Reasoning, E. Erdem, J. Lee, Y. Lier-
ler, and D. Pearce, Eds. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 7265. Springer, 102–116.
10 Bart Bogaerts, et al.
Denecker, M. 2012. The FO(·) knowledge base system project: An integration project (invited
talk). In ASPOCP.
Denecker, M. and Ternovska, E. 2008. A logic of nonmonotone inductive definitions. ACM
Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL) 9, 2 (Apr.), 14:1–14:52.
Denecker, M., Theseider-Dupre´, D., and Van Belleghem, K. 1998. An inductive defini-
tion approach to ramifications. Linkoping Electronic Articles in Computer and Information
Science 3, 7 (Jan.), 1–43.
Ferraris, P., Lee, J., and Lifschitz, V. 2011. Stable models and circumscription. Artificial
Intelligence 175, 236–263.
Giannotti, F., Pedreschi, D., Sacca`, D., and Zaniolo, C. 1991. Non-determinism in
deductive databases. In Deductive and Object-Oriented Databases, C. Delobel, M. Kifer, and
Y. Masunaga, Eds. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 566. Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
129–146.
Green, T. J., Aref, M., and Karvounarakis, G. 2012. Logicblox, platform and language:
A tutorial. In Datalog, P. Barcelo´ and R. Pichler, Eds. LNCS, vol. 7494. Springer, 1–8.
Hall, N. 2004. Two concepts of causation. In Causation and Counterfactuals.
Hitchcock, C. 2007. Prevention, preemption, and the principle of sufficient reason. Philosoph-
ical review 116, 4.
Krishnamurthy, R. and Naqvi, S. A. 1988. Non-deterministic choice in datalog. In JCDKB
(2002-01-03). 416–424.
McCain, N. and Turner, H. 1996. Causal theories of action and change. In AAAI/IAAI.
AAAI Press, 460–465.
McCarthy, J. and Hayes, P. J. 1969. Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of
artificial intelligence. In Machine Intelligence 4, B. Meltzer and D. Michie, Eds. Edinburgh
University Press, 463–502.
Milch, B., Marthi, B., Russell, S. J., Sontag, D., Ong, D. L., and Kolobov, A. 2005.
Blog: Probabilistic models with unknown objects. In IJCAI, L. P. Kaelbling and A. Saffiotti,
Eds. Professional Book Center, 1352–1359.
Pearl, J. 2000. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. Cambridge University Press.
Preyer, G. and Peter, G. 2002. Logical Form and Language. Clarendon Press.
Sacca`, D. and Zaniolo, C. 1990. Stable models and non-determinism in logic programs with
negation. In Proceedings of the Ninth ACM Symposium on Principles of Database Systems.
ACM Press, 205–217.
Van den Bussche, J. and Paredaens, J. 1995. The expressive power of complex values in
object-based data models. Information and Computation 120, 220–236.
Vennekens, J., Bruynooghe, M., and Denecker, M. 2010. Embracing events in causal
modelling: Interventions and counterfactuals in CP-logic. In Logics in Artificial Intelligence,
T. Janhunen and I. Niemela¨, Eds. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6341. Springer
Berlin Heidelberg, 313–325.
Vennekens, J., Denecker, M., and Bruynooghe, M. 2009. CP-logic: A language of causal
probabilistic events and its relation to logic programming. Theory and Practice of Logic
Programming 9, 3, 245–308.
Weidong, C. and Jinghong, Z. 1996. Nondeterminism through well-founded choice. The
Journal of Logic Programming 26, 3, 285–309.
You, J.-H., Zhang, H., and Zhang, Y. 2013. Disjunctive logic programs with existential
quantification in rule heads. Theory and Practice of Logic Programming 13, 563–578.
